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BRAZIL: THE POLITICS OF STATE ADMINISTRATION

Elisa P. Reis*

Introduction

The politics of state administration in Brazil from the 1930s on serves to illustrate the range of problems affecting bureaucracies in third world societies. The present overview of the Brazilian historical experience during this period begins with a brief review of discussions of the bureaucratic question among latecomers, as the issue originally appeared in the development literature and as it was later influenced by the critiques of bureaucracy raised in advanced capitalist as well as in existing socialist contexts.

Section two then explores the innovations brought to administrative structures and the role attributed to public bureaucracies across different regimes from 1930 to the present. Given the extent to which state structures have played a key role in economic growth, I focus on the administrative options characterizing each regime, examining these as political options made by the state. While I do not deny the usefulness of an analytical distinction between politics and bureaucracy, what I propose here is to concentrate on the interaction between bureaucratic patterns and structures and the nature of the prevailing political order.

Section three presents concluding remarks on Brazil's current attempt to consolidate a democratic political order while responding to the bureaucratic dilemma. I call attention to the fusing of the political and economic crises in this post-dictatorial era and argue that bureaucracy has remained a key variable in the economic growth equation, while its participation in the democratizing challenge seems to have expanded. I believe this conclusion justifies the quest

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for a better understanding of the politics of bureaucracy in Brazil and in other post-dictatorial contexts, as a contribution to democratizing theory and practice.

- I -

It is a commonplace to affirm that during this century the role of the state has been paramount in national development. Already in the nineteenth century, Germany set the standard that was to be reinforced by successful and unsuccessful developmental experiences all over the world, both capitalist and non-capitalist. The 1960s brought the apex of the development ideology in which public bureaucracies play a key role in the production of political, economic, and social goods. As LaPalombara stated in the preface to a prestigious collection of articles that he edited in 1963:

> *"Whereas much of the Western world developed with relatively little direct intervention by the 'public sector', this history will clearly not repeat itself. For reasons that range from economic necessity to ideological rigidity, the developing nations insist that government - particularly the bureaucracy - should play a major, even exclusive, role in affecting the changes that are thought. Thus, whether it is the building of roads, the creation of new industries, or the radical transformation of traditional villages, one can usually expect to find the bureaucracy intimately involved. Even in those places where some concessions are made to the participation of the 'private sector', such activity will be and probably must be carefully integrated with what government itself does"*(1).

Coherent with the above 'creed', reforms aimed at equipping the state with modern bureaucratic agencies were promoted throughout the third world and involved the channeling of international aid funds, the creation of numerous training programs, and the fueling of endless academic discussions. There was little doubt that in due time the newly created bureaucracies would dominate the scene, supplanting the typical dual pattern of transition to modernity that combined legal-rational structures with traditional ones, the latter based on old commitments and thus not adequate to meet developmental challenges.

The most optimistic versions of the modernizing ideology saw bureau-

cratic innovation as the remedy to more than just inefficient administration. The creation of new administrative posts based upon universalistic criteria was also meant to create an opportunity for the emergence of a new leadership capable of ousting long-entrenched elites from power. Thus, much of the developmental literature has explicitly or implicitly assigned governmental bureaucracy a key role: identified as strategic actors, bureaucrats were either deliberately or by default supposed to constitute the political opposition to traditional interest and backward sectors.

To a large extent, the endeavor to bureaucratize public power - something which has been intrinsic to development projects - responded not only to economic requirements but also to a concerted effort to promote the nation-state. Thus, the inauguration of public agencies in sparsely populated rural areas constituted a powerful instrument of state penetration and affirmed public authority against private powers, thereby enhancing the state-building enterprise. At the same time, the provision of services and goods by the newly established bureaucracies helped to foster social identification with public authority, in turn encouraging loyalty, the substratum of nation-building.

The optimistic developmental expectations prevailing in the sixties evolved, matured, and in most of the third world were laid to rest. Now, three decades later, bureaucracy has become the villain held responsible for economic inefficiencies, for the vicissitudes of public finances, for the arbitrary allocation of public services, and for the inhibition of social creativity. Paraphrasing LaPalombara, one could say that for reasons that range from economic necessity to ideological rigidity, 'bureaucratic shrinkage' has become the key word in the third world. Privatization, budget reductions, fiscal shock, small government, de-bureaucratization, and similar formulas popular in the new state imagery all entail drastic steps to re-dimension the size and scope of public bureaucracies.

While latecomers have grown disillusioned with public bureaucracies mainly due to the failure of development projects, most current critiques echo discourses elaborated in both the first and second worlds. Within mature capitalist societies, opposition to the 'big state' comes from both the left and the right. What mainly comes under attack by the left is the re-emergence of patrimonial features of the welfare state that curb social initiatives and consequently prevent the strengthening of social bonds(2). The right, on the other hand, aims its criticisms at the usurpation of market functions by the state and at the inefficient bureaucratic use of resources, where this use could be optimi-

zed through competitive mechanisms[3]. Vigorous opposition to bureaucracy is heard within the socialist sphere as well, where deep frustrations spring from the inefficient fulfillment of economic functions as well as from the predominance of authority over social solidarity resources[4].

No doubt, many of the problems faced by existing socialism as well as by mature capitalism find close correspondence across the third world. In experimenting with more or less orthodox developmental strategies, the latecomers have usually found themselves encumbered with a huge state machine accused of technical rigidity and the despotic use of power and blamed for the fiscal crisis.

While from a generic perspective these recurrent criticisms of bureaucracy remain universally valid, third world countries run the risk of importing misplaced ideologies. For example, much of the privatist discourse popular among neo-conservatives in mature capitalist societies addresses situations where citizenship was long ago extended de jure and de facto to all social sectors. The society-wide granting of full citizenship rights typical of mature capitalism means that the state does not have to compensate for a deficit in social solidarity as it does in less developed societies. Moreover, within the latter, the fulfillment of economic functions by the state has itself served to crystallize privileges among private sectors, which in turn has contaminated the market and made it heavily dependent upon authority mechanisms.

Much of the competitive vigor usually associated with the market consequently has thus never found expression among latecomers. While this brings to mind the problems currently confronting Eastern Europe, any parallel must again be carefully qualified. As far as social structure is concerned, the differences between existing socialism and third world capitalism are so dramatic as to make the implications of a move toward a restitution of market functions radically different here and there.

In brief, public bureaucracies in third world countries today share many of the vices plaguing the developed capitalist world as well as many of those afflicting former socialist societies, while they at the same time preserve their own peculiarities, augmenting the complexity of these situations and posing the need for original theoretical elaborations and original policy solutions.

Comparisons with first and second world societies are of paramount importance, but equally critical is the effort to arrive at generalizations concerning the peculiar blend of market and of authority that characterizes the latecomers. The discussion that follows, while somewhat superficial and restricted to the experience of a single country, seeks to place Brazilian historical processes in an analytical perspective that might prove a fruitful basis for generalizations on public bureaucracies in the third world.

- II -

Brazilian public administration has a long-standing negative reputation for being too centralized, inefficient, parasitic, and oversized. Both official and popular explanations of this state of affairs usually stress the influence of Portuguese patrimonial structures. Our colonial heritage is blamed for the proliferation of state agencies whose main function is to offer an opportunity for the exercise of patronage power and also for the endless bureaucratic routines that Brazilians must cope with in daily life.

Genetic explanations do in fact seem to play an important role. The colonial administration forced Brazil to adopt a rigidly centralized system of control based on prebendal jurisdictions, a formalistic legal tradition, and excessive concern with the regulation of societal development[5]. The fact that national independence was attained without a liberation struggle certainly contributed to preserving administrative continuities[6].

It has, however, never been satisfactorily explained just how and why objective conditions permitted the persistence of this tradition, despite explicit efforts to reverse it. Even if we take the notorious resilience of bureaucratic structures into account, the fact remains that the dynamics of the Brazilian state-building process and the strategies of economic development that were adopted greatly stimulated further proliferation of bureaucracy and centralization of power[7].

Historically, the expansion of the state apparatus became particularly noticeable after the Revolution of 1930[8]. As the country was transformed under the aegis of the state into an increasingly urban and industrialized society, the bureaucratization of public authority expanded greatly. Vargas, in power from 1930 to 1945, led a successful drive toward modernization from above, with the politics of state administration playing the key role.

Under Vargas came a major effort to modify public administration, especially after 1938. The landmark of these efforts was the creation of the

DASP (Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público), a federal agency entrusted with the formulation and implementation of norms governing the functioning of the central government administration and the civil service. The new agency introduced a meritocratic system into the federal administration and made job entrance and promotion exams mandatory within bureaucratic agencies. The DASP also placed critical legal-rational limits on bureaucratic initiatives, particularly those related to resource allocation and accounting controls[9].

The general idea behind this administrative reform was to equip the Brazilian state with a modern, efficient, and reliable administrative structure in order to promote national development. To this end, deliberate efforts were made to approximate the Weberian ideal-model of a legal-rational administrative instrument. The administrative reforms undertaken by Vargas' modernizing dictatorship most certainly constituted a significant departure from the old patrimonial tradition.

It is possible to identify multiple goals in the politics concerning bureaucracy that was implemented during the Vargas years. Analytically, I would distinguish four different, although inter-related purposes behind the administrative model pursued during that period: First, as indicated above, innovations in recruitment and training practices, career patterns, and civil service conceptions were intended to respond to a critical need to improve the efficiency of the bureaucratic machine. That is to say, reforms altering administrative practices and bureaucratic behavior were intended to increase state performance.

Second, administrative innovation under Vargas sought to fashion instruments that would promote rapid economic growth. The industrialization model adopted granted the state the leading role in basic economic activities, with the aim of laying down pre-conditions and creating incentives for private industrial investments[10].

Third, administrative reforms were used as an instrument to create public power. In other words, the establishment of new public structures provided an opportunity to affirm state authority vis-à-vis the power pretensions of long-standing oligarchies. In this sense, bureaucratic politics played a decisive role in the state-building enterprise, sharpening the distinction between public and private power.

Fourth, bureaucratic growth during this period also reflected a significant nation-building effort. Since political incorporation followed the premises of state-corporatism, it was mainly through the bureaucratic dispensation of

social rights that the state invested in the legitimation of power. Popular political support was basically built upon the extension of labor rights to urban workers who were tied to the state through the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Labor and through state-padronized unions[11]. In practice, the sustained growth of the industrial sector made the expanding labor market the critical source of political incorporation. The labor card became the instrument of access to citizenship rights[12].

It is undeniable that during the period of 1930-45 the politics of state administration scored high as far as the state - and nation-building enterprises are concerned. There is also consensus as to the remarkable success of newly established state agencies assigned productive functions. Yet most analysts today would agree that results were far from satisfactory in terms of efficiency and accountability.

In relation to bureaucratic efficiency, not only did many longstanding problems persist, but the very modifications that were introduced themselves had pernicious effects[13]. The demands of political compromise forced the continuation of patronage recruitment patterns, wherein hirings were officially justified as only temporary but would in fact become permanent appointments. At the same time, new agencies established to meet developmental challenges were placed under the direct responsibility of the executive, furthering the growth and concentration of state power. In short, this first attempt to modernize bureaucracy was a de facto sanctioning of what would become a well-established dualistic tradition in Brazilian administration: parasitism and inefficiency, on the one hand, and lack of accountability, on the other.

The 1945 return to democratic-constituional politics did not greatly alter these established patterns. Under the pressure of reactivated party politics, public sector patronage expanded. So did the creation of new executive agencies as a solution for overcoming the incapacity of already existing ones. Thus, during the so-called liberal period from 1945 to 1964, a series of piecemeal initiatives were undertaken to counteract bureaucratic impasses; instead of an all-encompassing attempt to reform the administration, the government opted for multiple and ad hoc remedies to administrative problems.

In retrospect, one could say that during this period bureaucratic innovation was no longer perceived as part of a state-building strategy, essentially becoming instead a means of stimulating economic growth[14]. This is most clearly visible under the Juscelino Kubitschek administration (1955-60), when task forces became the typical bureaucratic solution in the implementation of

development projects. In addition, through the creation of autarchic agencies and state foundations, the government managed to circumvent bureaucratic inefficiency without challenging established patron-client network or pork barrel practices.

Thanks to the above-mentioned strategy, the gap between the traditional civil service and the more recently established agencies became institutionalized[15]. Worst of all, this gap lent grounds to the generalized belief that the efficiency of the new administrative sector was based on its organizational autonomy and its technocratic independence from social demands. By implication, endeavors to improve the traditional sector began to be seen as as worthless. Ironically, the period we usually think of as the 'democratic intermezzo' in Brazil history thus sanctioned administrative practices and related beliefs that ran contrary to the notions of accountability and social responsiveness normally associated with the democratic model.

In short, the politics of administration that characterized the 1945-64 democratic regime was directed essentially toward economic growth. No bureaucratic reforms were attempted, and the proliferation of new agencies did not come in response to any concerted institutional plan. Rather than representing an attempt to improve the performance of existing bureaucracies, what took place looked more like a pragmatic strategy to adopt ad hoc solutions to new administrative challenges.

Given Brazil's relative economic prosperity and the multiplication of new sources of investments, the door was open to widespread bureaucratic corruption. The development ideology substituted state - and nation-building projects. More precisely, the strengthening of the nation-state was mainly dependent on economic development. National development became more important than state growth. But to the extent that state involvement in economic production was already deeply ingrained, there was ample room for a variety of alliances and compromises between public and private sectors.

All in all, during the democratic intermezzo the state managed to bypass the obstacles posed by the heavy administrative structure inherited from the previous period, thanks to the ability to introduce new administrative structures to cope with developmental challenges. However, solutions remained shaky and provisory and administrative impasses arose that would eventually need to be dealt with. Given that bureaucratic proliferation did not conform to an institutional project, the state spared itself heavy investments in bureaucratic reforms but ended up faced with a multitude of administrative structures that

through duplication, neutralization, and a general lack of coordination pushed up administrative costs and were detrimental to the transparency of power.

Concluding this overview of the second period under consideration, it can be said that the politics of administration then adopted was in some ways highly pragmatic and flexible, and as such they contributed to stifling dynamism in the economy and to accommodating competitive social interests. However, what in the short run constituted pragmatism and flexibility was to quickly be transformed into opportunism, into a lack of administrative strategy, and into the erecting of bureaucratic obstacles to development.

While economic growth indexes signaled a reduced dynamism during the early sixties, rising inflation, growing social unrest, and political polarization laid the grounds for a military coup. The quest for state structures better suited to meeting the nation's major challenges played a key role in the dictatorial discourse. In two decades of military rule in Brazil (1964-84), public bureaucracies took on a multitude of administrative, technical, political, and economic functions. The ruling army adopted a new model of modernization from above, one in which policy activities were presented as substitutes for the political disputes that had been despotically brought to a hait.

This new political model - which was adopted in several Latin American coutries as well as in other dictatorial experiments elsewhere in the developing world - came to be conceptualized as bureaucratic authoritarianism, a title earned due to the centrality of state bureaucracies in commanding political, economic, and social life in conjunction with a national development project[16].

Coherent with the above, the authoritarian regime installed in Brazil in 1964 opted to once again move toward administrative reform. To this end, legislation was approved in 1967 (Decree-Law No. 200) in order to adjust governmental structures to the newly adopted economic model. Since the government was willing to become more responsive to business interests (particularly international ones) in terms of regulation, infrastructure, and services, changes in administrative regulations became strategic. The reforms also aimed to expand state control over society.

The duality of purposes behind the reform measures to some extent explains not only their contradictory, centralizing, and decentralizing implications but also the open dissatisfaction expressed by a number of their earlier supporters who eventually became critical of the changes undertaken[17]. Centralization did occur to the extent that the margin of exclusive executive competence in administrative matters was significantly expanded. Many of the state

agencies were in fact subordinated directly to the national presidency and became de facto autonomus bodies protected by the alleged superiority of purely technical concerns over the give-and-take of politics.

Some observers refer to the above phenomenon as a form of Balkanization and call attention to the subsequent increase in the discretionary powers of certain state agencies. Agency employees also earned much higher salaries than their counterparts in the traditional public sector and enjoyed much better pension and retirement plans in addition to many other fringe benefits. In short, this so-called technocratic sector of the state administration, which constituted the back-bone of the military dictatorship, came to constitute a kind of aristocracy within the public service[18].

A clear illustration of the visible expansion of the 'indirect' administration under the military is the fact that of the 251 federal state enterprises active in 1980, nearly half had been created during the preceding ten years[19]. Also revealing is the fact that between 1960 and 1980 technical and scientific occupations (where the government is the leading employer) more than doubled their participation in the economically active population, jumping from 2.5 million (3.1%) to 8.2 million (6.8%). During the same period, the participation of the conventional public sector rose from 3.1% of the EAP to 4.1%[20].

Included among the de-centralization measures of the 1967 reform was a move to facilitate contracts with private firms for the supplying of goods and services to the public sector. The justification was the claim that private capital was much more efficient than the bulky state machinery in performing economic tasks. In practice, private firms transformed themselves into clients of the state and made use of non-market resources to secure new contracts, either by invoking their social functions as large-scale employers or by resorting to less honorable instruments of persuasion.

As this brief historical overview suggests, two major attempts at bureaucratic reform in Brazil were implemented by authoritarian regimes eager to increase their powers of control: one under Vargas and the other under military rule. Both experiences have to bem understood as part and parcel of state-building projects sponsored by dictatorial governments, the first civil and the second military. In between the two, attempts to modernize administrative practices reflected pragmatic economic considerations rather than concerted efforts to expand public power.

There were of course significant differences between the politics of state administration implemented in the period of 1930-45 and those implemented

by the ruling army starting in the mid-sixties. In terms of the above discussion, it is possible to conclude that under Vargas, administrative reform and innovation were the key to national development. At that time, the purposes of administrative reform ranged from the intent to alter the bureaucratic ethos and bureaucratic performance, so as to increase efficiency, to the intent to administrate the political market through the distribution of welfare benefits.

Under the military, no all-encompassing administrative reforms were implemented. The modifications of administrative legislation adopted in 1967, although of profound consequences, were basically aimed at making room for the entrepreneurial state as well as for private capital. In coherence with the option for an economic strategy that delayed distribution in favor of concentrated growth, the dictatorial state initially dealt with its own bureaucratic agencies essentially either as production units or as instruments of coercion.

State - and nation-building were of course central concerns for the military, but here their project was modeled on the premise that the economic dynamism of state enterprises was to be the major instrument in creating public power and that economic performance would in turn fortify popular support.

Only in sparsely populated rural areas was there an explicit effort to expand the administrative machinery. In a way, this led to the conclusion of a process of bureaucratization if power that had long been completed in urban areas. These efforts significantly altered power networks in rural areas, substituting new state officers for old local bosses and strengthening national loyalty among the ruralites through the final granting of minimal citizenship rights to rural workers[21].

In assessing the overall results of the changes introduced by 1967 administrative legislation (Decree-Law 200), one can see that despite the many failures of the new legal provisions, gains were indeed made in efficiency, reverting mainly in favor of central state authorities. Market interests also benefited (even if in a less obvious way), since an explicit commitment to the acceleration of capitalist development permeated all these moves toward change.

It is undeniable, however, that public bureaucracies did not become more responsive to social needs, that unaccountability continued to be justified in the name of national development, and that while state economic initiatives benefited from modernizing changes, the government was never seriously concerned with offering better administrative services to the citizenry.

Bureaucratic structures were so closely identified with the arbitrariness and unaccountability of power that among the most visible of the defunct military regime's moves to liberalize from within was the National De-Bureaucratization Program, established in 1979. Cutting red-tape and making bureaucracies accountable came to constitute (at least at the rhetorical level) official signs of government willingness to embark upon a democratizing experiment[22]. Given that the modernizing dictatorship of this period had been aptly described as bureaucratic authoritarianism, it was obvious that any move toward liberalization would necessarily entail a deliberate effort to improve both the responsiveness and the accountability of the public sector.

It is quite clear that the National De-bureaucratization Program mainly fulfilled the symbolic-expressive role of substantiating government concern over the vicissitudes citizens encounter in their dealings with the state[23]. The effective impact on administrative routines and bureaucratic behavior was far from impressive. In any case, the popularity gained by the Program in its heyday attests to the dramatic salience of bureaucratic shortcomings and wrongdoings in the daily life of individual citizens and of collective actors. In this sense, the symbolic attempt to correct bureaucracies, which the military regime used to signal its willingness to liberalize from within, highlighted the tight relationship between bureaucratic practices and the scope and meaning of citizenship.

- III -

The civilian government inaugurated in 1985, with the explicit task of implementing the democratic transition that had been negotiated with the military, seemed willing to honor the commitment to remedy public bureaucracies. Initially, the survival of the De-Bureaucratization Program seemed to suggest that it could gain momentum and help to improve accountability, thus strengthening democratic forces. But the very revalorization of politics deflated the concerted effort to improve bureaucratic transparency and responsiveness.

In practice, the De-bureaucratization competed with other cabinets and with politicians for brokerage functions; naturally, open competition was not in its favor. While under authoritarianism the National De-bureaucratization Program benefited from a monopoly, under the rules of the political market it could not match its competitors ability to effectively bypass bureaucratic obstacles and to mediate access to public services.

The Program was soon canceled and its ombudsman-like features were dispersed among a series of more traditional channels of political brokerage. With the revalorization of the vote-currency in the political arena, politicians disputed opportunities to mediate between citizens and street-level bureaucrats, between interest groups and state firms, and between local governments and top cabinet officers.

This is not to say that public accountability was greater under the dictatorship than under the current civilian regime, nor that bureaucratic oppression has worsened. The mere re-establishment of basic civil and political rights has acted as a powerful deterrent to many abuses of administrative power. However, it cannot be ignored that throughout the five years that have passed since the military stepped down, the rectification of public bureaucracies has not ranked high on the political agenda. While the drafting of the new Constitution set the stage for a through revision of the relationship between politics and administration, little has been done to institutionalize changes in that direction. After twenty years of deliberate intertwining of politics and bureaucracy, the nation is faced with an established bureaucracy that, not surprisingly, over the years came to internally reproduce the fragmentation of interests typical of politics[24].

This is particularly notable in the case of state firms, which take advantage of their ambiguous public/private identity and combine market and authority criteria, circumventing the conventional mechanisms through which accountability is enforced. With their own constituencies in civil society, these powerful bureaucracies are sometimes described as states within the state[25]. They have, for example, defied government attempts to enforce new public sector regulations and have successfully resisted anti-inflationary wage policies.

With regard to bureaucratic agencies in the direct administration, and as indicated in the previous section, the long-established tradition of creating bureaucratic agencies parallel to the older state structures confined the latter to a marginal position where poor working conditions, insufficient pay, and low morale have produced an environment prone to extreme inefficiency and irresponsiveness.

The dramatic economic crisis afflicting Brazil hampers the always tense relationship between politics and bureaucracy and increases the complexity of the democratizing challenge. In confronting a multitude of political, social, and economic problems, public authorities must also search for new patterns of

interaction between politicians and bureaucrats as a sine qua non to the consolidation democracy[26].

In this kind of context, the currently observed temptation to put full blame for the gigantic economic crisis on the public sector constitutes a severe threat to the consolidation of a democratic order. If it is true that the functioning of the public sector is the driving force behind the huge state deficit, it might prove disastrous to opt for the radical privatization scheme that appears to be gaining ever more prestige in the political market.

The persistence of bureaucratic inefficiency, a lack of transparency in government, and despotism have certainly played important roles in recent Brazilian history. However, the emulation of radical liberalism would surely require the state to abdicate part of its legitimate functions in favor of the market. Considering that in most of the third world, capitalism has evolved under 'savage' social conditions that have sanctioned extreme inequalities, re-entrusting the market with functions it has actually never had would jeopardize social solidarity and hinder economic growth.

What has been stated here is not meant as a defence of irresponsible state capitalism or of the patrimonial-like features inherent to the authoritarian welfarism traditionally adopted by Brazil. My argument is that as long as a significant parcel of the population has to struggle fiercely to assure its mere survival, handing social regulatory power over to the market would have explosive consequences.

Given that past experiences reveal the dramatic consequences of state efforts to curb market functions and that these same experiences suggest that the indiscriminate privatization of functions performed by public bureaucracies jeopardizes solidarity, we are left with the same old challenge of reconciling politics and bureaucracy. This might appear to some as an endless regression to nowhere. Yet, I hope the arguments presented here help to clarify conditions that are peculiar to Brazil as well as to other late-developing capitalist societies. These conditions seem to suggest that the knots entangling political and economic crises are perhaps tighter now than ever in such societies. They also suggest that the politics of public bureaucracies will play a key role in forging both the conditions for economic growth and the prospects for democratic consolidation.

NOTES

1. Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), **Bureaucracy and Political Development,** Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. ix.

2. John Keane, **Public Life in Late Capitalism,** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

3. Jean-François Revel, **Comment les Démocraties Finissent**, Paris: Grasset, 1983.

4. The recent upsurge of market forces and the strengthening of social movements in Eastern Europe, while in many respects interdependent, clearly justify analytical differentiation.

5. On the Portuguese patrimonial legacy see Raimundo Faoro, **Os Donos do Poder**, Porto Alegre: Globo, 1958. The persistence of patrimonial features in Brazilian politics is discussed in Simon Schwartzman, **As Bases do Autoritarismo Brasileiro**, Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982.

6. The son and representative of the Portuguese king declared Brazilian independence in 1822.

7. Elisa P. Reis, "The Agrarian Roots of Authoritarian Modernization in Brazil: 1880-1930", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, Mass., MIT, 1979, chapter IV.

8. Mario W. Vieira da Cunha, **O Sistema Administrativo Brasileiro,** Rio de Janeiro: CBPE, 1963; Werner Baer, I. Kertzenetzky and A. Villela, "The Changing Role of the State in the Brazilian Economy", **World Development,** Vol. 11, 1973; Luciano Martins, **Pouvoir Politique et Development Economique: Formation et Evolution des Structures Politiques au Brésil,** Paris: Anthropos, 1976.

9. Mario W. Vieira da Cunha, op. cit.; Gilbert Siegel, **The Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: a Study of the DASP**, Washington, DC: Universtiy Press of America, 1978.

10. This is perhaps the best-documented aspect of bureaucracy under Vargas. See, for example, Luciano Martins, op. cit.; Robert Levine, **The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-38,** New York: Columbia University Press, 1970; John Wirth, **The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-54**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.

11. Philippe Schmitter, **Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil,** Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971; Luiz J. Werneck Vianna, **Liberalismo e Sindicato no Brasil,** Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976.

12. Wanderley G. dos Santos, **Cidadania e Justiça,** Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1979.

13. Lawrence S. Graham, **Civil Service Reform in Brazil: Principle Vs. Practice,** Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968. Fernando C. Garcia, "Uma Interpretação dos Impasses e um Projeto Alternativo", in IPEA/INPES, **Modernização Administrativa,** Rio de Janeiro, 1983.

14. Naturally, upon Vargas' return to the national presidency (1950-54), this time through the pools, we witness an attempt to re-establish his past bureaucratic politics. However, the altered political-institutional conditions for enforcing power, on the one hand, and the very dynamics of economic growth, on the other, prevented a complete re-enactment of past administrative projetcts.

15. Edson O. Nunes and B. Geddes, "Clientelism and Political Insulation: Towards a Political Sociology of Contemporary Brazil," in John Wirth, Edson O. Nunes and Thomas Bogenschild (eds.), **The State and Society in Brazil: Continuity and Change**, Bolder: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 147-78.

16. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," **Latin America Research Review,** 1978, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 3-38.

17. Hélio Beltrão, 1967 author of Decree-Law 200 and later to become the first Minister of De-bureaucratization, complained bitterly about the distortion of the original objectives of this law and, chief among them, of the incentives offered to private entrepreneurship.

18. Since the military stepped down, politicians have earned immediate profits from their opposition to these privileged sectors of public administration. The victorious 1989 presidential campaign was based largely upon an aggressive attrack of the privileged echelons of the state bureaucracy.

19. Thomas, J. Trebat, **Brazil's State-Owned Enterprises, A Case Study of the State as Entrepreneur,** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 37.

20. Carlos Hasenbalg and N. Valle e Silva, **Estrutura Social, Mobilidade e Raça,** São Paulo: Vértice, 1988, p. 16 and 22.

21. Elisa P. Reis, "Mudança e Continuidade na Política Rural Brasileira", **DADOS**, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1988, pp. 203-18.

22. João Batista Araújo e Oliveira, **Desburocratização e Democracia,** Campinas: Papirus, 1984.

23. Elisa P. Reis, "Bureaucratic Oppression: The Citizen's View," paper presented at the Third International Conference on Bureaucracy, Gottlieb Duttweiler Institute, Zurich, October 1984.

24. On the inevitable fragmentation of the interests of bureaucratic government, see Guy Peters, "The Problem of Bureaucratic Politics," Vol. 43, No. 1, 1981, pp. 55-82.

25. Elisa P. Reis and Luiz Orenstein, "The Transparency Issue: Public and Private Access to Information in the Brazilian Transition to Democracy", **Journal of Behavioral and Social Sciences,** Tokyo, Vol. 29, 1989, pp. 121-33.

26. Elisa P. Reis, "Bureaucrats and Politicians in Current Brazilian Politics," **International Social Sciences Journal,** 123, February 1990, pp. 19-30.

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